The Struggle over the Past by Gordon, Robert W.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1996
The Struggle over the Past
Robert W. Gordon
Yale University
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123 (1996)
SIXTY-FIRST CLEVELAND-MARSHALL FUND LECTURE
THE STRUGGLE OVER THE PAST
ROBERT W. GORDON'
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW RIGHT AND THE REVIVAL OF
HISTORICAL ARGUMENT ............................. 123
II. USES OF HISTORY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT-A BRIEF
TAXONOMY ........................................ 124
I. AMERICAN PRACTICE-A VERY SHORT HSTORY ........... 126
IV. CHALLENGESTO LIBERAL PROGRESS ..................... 129
V. NEO-PROGRESSIVE AND RADICAL RESPONSES:
COUNTERHISTORIES .................................. 137
VI. CRITIQUES OF THE REVIVAL OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY
LIBERALISM ........................................ 139
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW RIGHTAND THE REVIVAL OF
HISTORICAL ARGUMENT
In the last twenty years there has been a remarkable revival of historical
modes of argument and justification in the legal practices of the United States.
In a country often accused of lacking any consciousness of its past, lawyers,
judges and legal scholars have been engaged in a series of epic struggles to
dominate the interpretation of history in order to make it serve their present
agendas. In part, of course, these legal debates are echoes of general political
controversies; primarily between, on the one hand, left- and center-liberals
(Progressive Liberals, for short) who would like to preserve or even extend the
policies of the 20th-century regulatory welfare state and Rights Revolution and,
on the other hand, neo-liberals and cultural conservatives (the New Right, for
short) who believe that precisely those policies have been the main cause of
economic and cultural decline and must therefore be rescinded. One party
believes it has been following a path of progress which, if continued, will lead
to fulfillment of the nation's traditional ideals. The other party believes that the
lJohnston Professor of Law, Yale University. This lecture is part of a continuing
enterprise of reflection on the uses of history in legal argument. Some portions of it have
been adapted (in compressed and revised form) from lectures I gave at the University
of Michigan Law School in 1993 and at the University of Kyoto Law School in 1995. I
would like to thank the Dean, faculty and students of the Cleveland-Marshall College
of Law, and especially Professor David Goshien, for their hospitality and stimulating
comments during my stay in Cleveland in November of 1995.
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Progressive, New Deal, Great Society, and cultural trends of the 20th century
represent a betrayal of those ideals, and that to be true to the traditions of its
Founders the society must restore the principles it foolishly abandoned and
return to an earlier and uncorrupted state.
The history of law has come to be vital contested ground in these
controversies. The New Right parties who are in the political ascendancy,
indeed now poised to transform the national state apparatus and its legal
institutions, have developed an elaborate and quite sophisticated legal
ideology. Much of this ideology relies upon relatively abstract reason: natural
law libertarianism and utilitarian political economy. But history also plays a
central role. History supplies an original Constitution, from which much 20th
century political innovation, especially the expansion of the powers of
government to regulate business property, the large-scale delegation of
legislative power to administrative bureaucracies, and the new judge-made
limits on the power of public authorities to control crime and deviance and to
promote morality and religious observance, is seen as an unacceptable
departure. History supplies a set of basic ground rules; the "traditional
principles of the common law" of tort, property, contract, labor and unfair
competition for the proper constitution of economic life, from which much
modem law, both judge-made and statutory law, is seen as having improperly
deviated. History supplies a set of "traditional values," traditionally protected
by legislatures through the criminal sanction and morals legislation, and
enforced by the delegation of discretion to various authorities to control the
lives of children, juvenile delinquents, criminals, and the dependent poor. Both
the values and the authority of those who would enforce them are seen as
having been fatally undermined by the "Rights Revolution" pioneered by the
Supreme Court and liberal welfare policies of the 1960s and 70s. History
supplies a basic Grundnorm of liberal society, the norm of "color-blind equal
opportunity," which requires for its implementation a legal system structured
to preserve a competitive capitalism, with formally-equal rights for each and
special privileges or special disabilities for none, which supposedly will
operate so as to reward every individual precisely in proportion to his or her
merit, which is seen as violated by many modem programs of special subsidies
and exemptions, especially "affirmative action" systems of preferences for
women and for blacks and other minorities.
As the New Right ideology spreads among elite decision-makers and
intellectuals, it poses a serious challenge to the Progressive-liberal consensus
about the legal meanings of history that had previously dominated American
legal thought for a very long time, from approximately the 1940s through the
1970s. The historical claims of New Right ideology in particular have touched
off a number of fierce debates among Old (Progressive) Liberal, New Right,
and radical legal intellectuals.
II. USES OF HISTORY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT-A BRIEF TAXONOMY
It will help to put the current debates in perspective if we can see them as
variations on some of the standard modes in which lawyers make use of history.
For simplicity, let's classify the basic modes as static, dynamic, and critical.
In the static modes, lawyers argue that a legal norm or rule or practice has a
fixed meaning that has been established by past usage. This may be an
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antihistorical argument for following a rule that is unchanging because it is
timeless and universal, not dependent for its validity on time or place, as in the
case of a natural law norm. It also may be simply an argument for following
precedent, for maintaining continuity, for doing things the way they have been
done before. The expanded version of this argument is the argument from
tradition or long-established custom, or time immemorial. Perhaps most often,
however, the argument refers to a definite historical location. It calls for
adherence to the original understanding of a text or the original intentions of
a founding legislator. Sometimes it privileges a particular time and place as
having special authority because especially worthy of respect or imitation.
In the dynamic modes lawyers argue that the interpretation of legal texts and
rules and principles does and must change over time to adapt to changing
conditions.2 The most ambitious dynamic modes are those in which the
interpreter suggests (or tacitly assumes) that legal evolution follows some
patterned historical tendency, an underlying direction of political, economic or
social change.
Static and dynamic modes have in common that the lawyer appeals to
history for authority; to the authority of an original text or tradition or founding
moment, or to the authority of the course of history itself, that is to the changing
circumstances or long-run evolutionary trends that dictate the need for a new
rule or new interpretation. The past is read as if it were a legal text with binding
force, even if what is being cited is not exactly a text, but a body of intentions
or a collection of practices. The premise is that if we decipher the signs correctly,
we can read out of them principles and precedents that ought to control current
interpretations. The past can control the present because it is continuously
connected with the present through narratives of stasis or tradition, or of
progress or decline.
The critical modes by contrast are used to destroy, or anyway to question, the
authority of the past. They assert discontinuous breaks between past and
present. In ordinary legal argument perhaps the most familiar of these critical
modes is the argument from obsolescence or changed circumstances; the
argument that the original reasons or purposes of a rule have ceased to exist,
or that the rule sprang from motives or a context that are no longer acceptable
to modem eyes, are rooted in ugly, barbaric, primitive conceptions or practices.
Another critical mode in this sense is ironic history, as in the "argument from
perversity" which Albert Hirschman has identified as an enduring feature of
conservative political rhetoric, 3 the argument that well-intentioned past
2Strict textualism-the view that interpreters should look only to the words of the
text and ignore the context-often poses as a static mode ["The words of the Constitution
mean today what they have always meant"] but in actual practice this is a dynamic
mode, since the reader of words who is allowed to ignore their context will necessarily
read into them the conventional meanings of his own time and place. The words are left
free to float and soak up later and changing meanings.
3 ALBERT 0. HIRscHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY, FUTILITY,
JEOPARDY (1991).
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enactments have brought about the reverse of their intended results, and
should therefore not serve as models for current practice.
III. AMERICAN PRACTICE-A VERY SHORT HISTORY
In historical practice, American lawyers have generally combined static and
dynamic modes with an occasional but definitely muted and minor theme of
critical ones. Here's a short and simple version of the story:
The Revolutionaries of 1776 argued their cause against the English in a
dominantly static mode: that they were asserting the common law rights of
free-born Englishmen under the ancient "Gothic" Constitution of Anglo-Saxon
England, which had subsequently been corrupted by the tyrannical practices
of church and state under the "canon and the feudal law."4 At the same time,
the Revolutionaries shared with other Englishmen a dynamic view of political
history, according to which those ancient liberties had been gradually
recovered over centuries of struggle and finally confirmed in the constitutional
settlement of the Glorious Revolution of 1689. Americans believed that the
English Crown and Parliament had been illicitly reversing the course of history
and once again conspiring against traditional liberty in their treatment of the
colonies.5 The colonists' basic argument, therefore, called for progress towards
the restoration of the past.
By the 19th century, American lawyers had changed the mode of argument.
The basic Anglo-Saxon liberties were now protected by written Constitutions
and bills of rights, removing (for the most part) the need to consult the history
of more ancient times. The issue was now the status of the common law
inherited from England. There were several different common law traditions,
living side by side but each obeying a different logic or tempo of time. The static
tradition of the immemorial Gothic Constitution or ancient rights of
Englishmen, as noted, was yoked to a dynamic story, the Whig history of the
recovery of original Anglo-Saxon liberty through centuries of struggle against
feudalism and tyranny towards the mixed Constitution. And that dynamic
story was grafted on to a genuinely progressive history, the Scottish
Enlightenment's four-stage theory of the development of modem society, in
which law evolved in ways that were thought to be functionally suitable to
each stage, hunters, shepherds, agrarian and commercial society, as they
succeeded one another.6 These dynamic themes, one specific to English history,
the other a more general hypothesis of the progressive development of
societies, were given a specifically national meaning, and destiny by the
4 John Adams, A dissertation on the Canon and the Feudal Law, 1 PAPERSOF JOHN ADAMS
127 (Robert J. Taylor, et al., eds. 1977).
5 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1967), JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LIBERTY: THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION
IN THE LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHYOF THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES, in THE
ROOTs OF LIBERTY (Ellis Sandoz, ed., 1993).
6 PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA (1980).
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American republican experiment, which was supposed to preserve the static
or timeless principles of English liberty, expressed in the common law, against
any further corruptions; and also to carry the dynamic ones toward a more
perfect realization than the world had ever seen. In this last theme we perceive,
even in the inherent conservatism of legal discourse, traces of the American
millennial dream, that in the New World the weight of history may be one day
shed altogether, and men and women freed to natural liberty.7
Thus, the task of American lawyers was not only to preserve the common
law's timeless principles and gradually-adapting slow-growing good customs,
but also to accelerate its dynamic aspects to move it forward out of feudalism
and the hierarchies of the corrupt old world.
Americans, of course, venerate their Federal Constitution and sacralize the
moment of its making and its text is their polity's supreme law. The Founding
period has the status of a Golden Age, and below the major themes of progress
in American legal writing there has always been a strong minor subtheme of
the jeremiad, lamenting declension from our origins. Yet the basic story told in
American legal writing is dynamic and progressive, the story of the
hand-in-hand progress of commerce and liberty, of the gradual emancipation
of individual freedom and reason from the shackles of feudal and mercantilist
restraints on land, labor and capital, and from the tyranny and superstition of
the rule of despots, nobles and established churches. This story in turn has
effortlessly modulated in legal narrative into the generally-accepted paradigm
of Western history as a movement "from status to contract" or simply of
"modernization," and of legal history as the gradual evolution of forms
functional to that modernizing process. The ancien regime and its incidents,
primogeniture, established churches, seditious libel, imprisonment for debt
and hostility to bankruptcy, customary monopolies, labor-conspiracy
prosecutions, married women's disabilities, indentured servitude, eventually
even slavery itself, and after slavery legalized segregation, gradually disappear
under the modeinizing pressures of commercial development. The master
theme is the emancipation of the freely choosing self: the release of individual
energy, the opening of opportunity, the removal of restrictions on choice,
gradual progress to the point where virtually all social relations in which
people may find themselves may be seen as instituted by their voluntary
consent. More and more groups shed special incidents of status and become
eligible to participate as legal equals in the polity and economy. Progress was
mainly defined in negative terms, as what we have been evolving'away
frm-which was "feudalism."8 (Later in the century "feudalism" was replaced
with "socialism" as liberty's great opposite.)
7 See ERNEST TUvESON, REDEEMER NATION: THE IDEA OF AMERICA'S MfILLENIAL ROLE
(1968); R.W.B. LEWIS, THE AMERICAN ADAM (1955).
8 See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, PRINCETON
REVIEW (1878); JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCEOF ENGLANDAND AMERICA
(1894).
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The story, as I say, combined static with dynamic elements, but emphasized
the dynamic. The Constitution and the common law had a core of "principle,"
of fundamental unchanging meanings. But principle had to be adapted to
changing circumstances, and above all, to the modernizing dynamic of
historical evolution. The static and dynamic modes were ultimately reconciled
through eleology: The assertion that basic legal principles were "working
themselves pure," were gradually evolving from primitive, obscure or cluttered
forms to the highest and best realization of themselves. The "Classical" liberals
who dominated legal thought at the end of the 19th century needed a dynamic
view of history because they knew perfectly well that the economic and
political liberalism they espoused had not existed in any pure form at the
Nation's founding: when there had been extensive mercantilistic restrictions
on trade, including wage and price controls and when there had been, above
all, legal protection of slavery.
The "Progressive" liberals who followed and criticized them preserved the
basic dynamism of the narrative. Some of the Progressive lawyers, to be sure,
were aggressively modernist in outlook, treating the past as a disposable
nuisance. The only use for history in this mode was to help shed the law of its
cobwebs by showing it up as antique, irrelevant, rooted in barbaric or obsolete
social contexts and outgrown conceptions. 9 In this critical and modernist mode
of Progressive history, legislation represented the capacity of self-conscious
collective efforts to overcome the force of custom and refashion the legal
framework by the dictates of utilitarian reason. The end-point in the most
optimistic versions was the escape from history and the promise of beginning
anew with scientific social-welfare legislation. But most Progressive jurists did
not seek to escape from history, but rather to conform the law to what they saw
as the pace and tendencies of historical change; and pragmatically to remold it
along the grain of those tendencies. Legislation in their view, was not against
or out of custom, but followed custom and was now to be the primary method
for adapting law to social evolution. The old common law framework had
become dysfunctional, overtaken by events, and had evolved too slowly to
cope with the rapidly changing conditions of industrial society. The
"individualist" premises of Classical legal thought, which had originated in the
natural-law thinking of the 17th and 18th centuries, had functioned well
enough in an older America, an agrarian society on an open frontier with
abundant land, a society of small independent producers, but was wholly
unsuited to an industrial society of giant organizations. 1° The realization of
individual freedom in such a society, as Chief Justice Hughes put in a famous
New Deal case, required "increased use of the organization of society in order
to protect the very bases of individual opportunity."11 Thus they revised the
9 See, e.g., 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920);
BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
10 See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921).
11Home Insurance Co. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442 (1934).
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story of stages of development to which legal change should be functional by
inventing a new stage of industrial or collective society. Its implications for
many Progressives were that the giant corporation should be legally
naturalized, but so should the labor union, and there should be a new role
recognized for the state in regulating both.12
Another line of Progressive critique was surprisingly traditional: that the
Classics had improperly ignored or disregarded the long-standing regulatory
doctrines contained in the common law itself; that the Classics' assertion of a
generalized Constitutional "liberty" to do as one wills with one's property, and
to contract on whatever terms one pleases, was an unwarranted radical
innovation that had never been part of traditional "due process," of "the law of
the land." The Progressives and New Dealers claimed that they, and not the
Classical liberals, were the true heirs of the Founders' original purposes, i.e.
that "energetic government" should engage in national planning in the public
interest. 13
The third great wave of liberal-legal ideologies, the "Rights Revolution"
engineered by the civil rights movement and by the Supreme Court under the
Chief Justiceship of Earl Warren and the federal executive under the leadership
of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and (surprisingly!) Richard Nixon, was also
faithful to the dynamic narrative of liberal progress. This phase tacked on a
further stage in the evolution of liberal societies, one in which the state had to
act affirmatively to bring groups who had been excluded or subordinated into
full legal personhood: women, blacks and other minorities, underrepresented
voters, aliens, the illegitimate, those accused of crimes, prisoners, mental
inmates and welfare recipients. The courts also expanded the sphere of
negative liberty, the right to be let alone, by finding new rights to expressive,
sexual and reproductive freedoms. With less success, some advocates urged
more radical claims to positive liberty as well, to the effective fulfillment of
economic and social rights such as the right to a minimum standard of living.14
But much of this rights-rhetoric was entirely tradition-based: the rights were
not new, but simply required to fulfill America's original liberal promise, such
as the libertarian right to the protection of "property" in an age where property
increasingly took the form of grants of state privileges, licenses or benefits. 15
lV. CHALLENGES TO LIBERAL PROGRESS
To summarize: American legal argument from the Founding onward
consistently relied upon a core narrative of liberal progress, the story of liberal
modernization, by which law both followed and facilitated the evolution of
12 See, e.g., Jeremiah Smith, Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation, 20 HARV. L. REV. 253,345,
429 (1907); Walton Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.J. 864 (1932).
13 See, e.g., HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (1909).
14 See Samuel Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare, 58
MINN. L. REV. 211 (1973).
15See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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society away from feudalism, tyranny and superstition and towards increasing
freedom. To reconcile this dynamic narrative with the need to assert continuity
with fundamental principles, the story was often told in a teleological mode,
as the gradual fulfillment of perfection of principles already immanent at the
Founding. As Abraham Lincoln said of the Declaration of Independence, which
had declared all men to be equal even as it established a polity that legalized
slavery the Declaration's authors
did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually
enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it
immediately upon them. In fact, they had no power to confer such a
boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of
it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to
set up a standard maxim for free society, which should be familiar to
all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and
even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and
thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and
augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors
everywhere.1
6
The core narrative underwent important mutations in its phases as
Classical-liberal, Progressive, and Rights-Revolution ideology. Each phase
always had its critics; reactionaries claiming that a new mutation was a betrayal
of foundational liberal principles, conservatives asserting that sweeping
radical innovations would disturb the natural course of gradual and prudent
evolution, left-liberals claiming that progress was not moving nearly fast or far
enough.
By the late 1960s, some of the critiques took on a more radical form. At first
such critiques came from the Left; from civil rights lawyers, organizers of poor
communities and workers, feminists and anti-Vietnam War activists, who,
embittered by growing conservative resistance and backlash to the insurgent
social movements of the 1960s, began to lose faith in liberal progress; and to
diagnose economic, racial, and gender inequality as stemming from relatively
permanent structures of oppression ("capitalism," "racism" and "patriarchy")
varying over time in particular details, but ceaselessly taking on new and
virulent mutant forms.17 Some of these activists kept alive utopian-socialist
hopes of "Revolution." More often they were inclined to settle into a kind of
grim historical pessimism or, as in the case of black radicals who adopted the
rhetoric of Third World anti-colonialist nationalism, pursued a limited political
strategy of separation from, rather than reform of, the wider society.18
16Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (June 26,1857), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES
& WRITINGs, 1832-1858, 390, at 398.
17See, e.g. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973)
18 See Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (1990).
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In the meantime another set of challenges was brewing from the Right, one
that was to be much more influential, since the Reagan victory in 1980 suddenly
swept into positions of national power, the federal executive and judiciary, a
cadre of legal intellectuals: libertarians and law-and-economics scholars from
the University of Chicago and various conservative think-tanks. The lawyers
of the Reagan Revolution came to power determined to do to the entrenched
Progressive histories what the Progressives had done to the Classics: to
substitute a new story, with different heroic agents and a different ending, into
the standard narrative structure of the history of liberal society; and to some
extent to challenge the story altogether. Their influence has been deep and
pervasive and has posed the most serious challenge yet to the long reign of
Progressive orthodoxy.
At first glance the most striking feature of conservative legal thought seems
to be its historical pessimism; its apparent rejection of the dynamic narratives
of legal change, especially as embodied in the notions of an "evolutionary" or
"living" Constitution that the Classical and Progressive jurists had held in
common. Conservative legal thought has a decidedly nostalgic impulse, to
reproach modernist culture by reaching back into something before it. Its
discourses on social life follow the form of the jeremiad; a lament over the
declension of current generations from some exemplary golden age or set of
founding principles. Yet this is usually followed, in the optimistic American
vein, by an account of how, despite backsliding, with repentance and
discipline, the principles may be restored in an even better form. So the
designers of the imagery of the Reagan Revolution made it out that, with effort,
we could be ceaselessly moved forward into our virtuous past of intact families,
shared and rigorously enforced moral and religious convictions, and the
unregulated pursuit of acquisition.19
Of course the historical view with which New Right lawyers are mostly
identified is not a dynamic one at all, even a reactionary dynamism, but the
static, mode of frozen time: the various "originalist" theories of Constitutional
interpretation-in their extreme forms, the views that the contemporary
intentions or understandings of the Framing generations of 1787 and 1868
should be the exclusive determinants of Constitutional meanings. Judging by
the gross volume of paper produced, originalist exegesis is where President
Reagan's lawyers invested most of the resources they had to spend on history.20
The originalist impulse never infected some of the most prominent jurists of
the 1980s. Judge Richard Posner and Solicitor General Charles Fried, for
example, remained immune. But, it had brilliant and influential promoters in
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Antonin Scalia and almost-Justice
19The account that best captures this element in President Reagan's appeal is CARRY
WILLS, REAGAN'S AMERICA: INNOCENTS AT HOME (1987).
20Attorney General Edwin Meese declared this hermeneutics to be official
government policy. See Edwin Meese, Interpreting the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990).
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Robert Bork. As James Wilson has noted, 21 the originalism of these jurists owes
little to reverence towards the past or to the Founding Moments for their own
sake. Though Bork likes to invoke the name of Edmund Burke,22 and Scalia the
binding force of "tradition,"23 neither has any trace of the common-law mind,
the respect for the tiny irreducible particulars of customs accreting over slow
time, the reverence for what is simply because it has come gradually to be. The
conservative jurists have much more in common with the philosophic radicals
than with Burke or even Blackstone; they are positivists, who search the legal
universe for authoritative commands, preferably those reducible to the form
of code-like rules of general application. If the past cannot furnish us with
definite rules of decision, look elsewhere.
24
In their insistence that the "rule of law is a law of rules,"25 the
originalist-traditionalist jurists are, ironically, swimming against the main
current of traditional American historical jurisprudence, that is common-law
dynamic adaptationism, given content and direction by liberal modernization
theory. Nineteenth century lawyers generally resisted codification, for
example, because they supposed that its formulas would straitjacket legal
development.2 6 Progressive jurists' most telling objections to classical legal
science were similar: that it had become too slow and inflexible to deal with
changed conditions. Even codes are more flexible than the strict originalists'
rules. For in a legal regime that instructs judges to look each time only at the
code and not at the subsequent glosses, applications will change, even if
unconsciously, as social contexts and linguistic usages change. Strict
originalism seeks to freeze meanings against erosion by time; and this is rather
hard to achieve. One can of course seek to state the original principle at a high
enough level that it can be abstracted from context altogether, which leaves it
free to float and soak up later experience; or, more imaginatively, to work
toward a faithful "translation" of the principle, so that it will have similiar or
analagous effects in the new context to those aimed for in the old;27 but in
choosing either of these strategies one will leave strict originalism far behind.
If one takes one's originalism as a serious project of historical reconstruction,
21James G. Wilson, Justice Diffused, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 913 (1986)
22 ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). James Boyle however has
suggested that Bork's views are genuinely Burkean in another way, that, like Burke,
Bork wants to fabricate a historical myth of continuity between the present and an
imagined past. James Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modem Conservatism, 3
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 263 (1991).
23 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989).
24 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 UNIv. CIN. L. REV., 865 (1989).
25 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
2 6 CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT (1981).
2 7See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983);
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEx. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
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if one goes back in time to dredge up all the concrete practices of reading and
applying the rule that once defined its practical meaning, one will inevitably
discover (along with quite unmanageable degrees of conflict and ambiguity) a
lot of stuff that one does not want and cannot possibly convert to modem use.
Suppose we want to know what the Framing generation meant by federal
non-establishment of religion. In the cargo of norms and practices that we
salvaged from the sunken past, we would find some notables who thought that
the federal government should remain aloof from any and all religious
preferences and observances, though assuming as a matter of course that
official establishments would continue at the state level, some who promoted
religious observances on all public occasions to the great distress of other
prominent figures, some who robustly embraced the Erastian view that the
common and criminal law must enforce Christian prohibitions of sins like
blasphemy in order to shore up basic social and moral order, while others (like
the evangelical Baptists) just as passionately asserted that any government
endorsement of religious faith must necessarily corrupt that faith. We would
also find many who believed the non-establishment principle to be entirely
consistent with legislating disabilities for Catholics and Jews and a policy of
systematic eradication of native American Indians' and enslaved-Africans'
religions. 28 This is just a short list. If we are really going to revive original
understandings we will have to pick and choose our way among the relics,
polish some of them up quite a bit, and leave others quietly to rest at the bottom
of the sea. The dynamic readings of history have the advantage of giving us a
method, however mythic and simple-minded that method may sometimes be,
of connecting our present to our past in such a way as to argue that some story
of progress or intervening experience has made pieces of the original
understanding irrelevant, dead, anachronistic, obsolete.
But, in any case, the New Right jurists' commitments to originalist method
turned out in to be only fitful. To take one example among many, in the Lucas2 9
case of 1992, in which the Sup'reme Court held that government restriction of
developmental uses of beach front property might be an unconstitutional
taking, Justice Scalia suddenly pronounced all the historical evidence
illuminating the understanding of eminent domain law around 1800 to be
completely irrelevant and said that what would determine what counted as
property and what was a taking would be a "historical compact" around
flexible, dynamic state common law definitions of nuisance.
The Lucas opinion is revealing because it suggests that little of the
conservative legal program is animated by a hankering after
eighteenth-century values. It is primarily quite recent history, not the nation's
whole history, that the New Right wants to undo. Originalism is less a method
28 See, e.g., Michael McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); Douglas Laycock, Non-Coercive Support for
Religion, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 37 (1991); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS (1965); JON BUTLER, AWASH IN A SEA OF FArrH (1990).
29Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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of giving content to basic legal norms than of rolling back the judicial Rights
Revolution: the invention of new rights to liberty and property and privacy.
The overall formula of judicial "restraint" has to some extent been able to satisfy
the twin conservative agendas of deregulation in economic matters and the
restoration of "traditional" authority in social ones. The courts have been more
inclined to "defer" to executive agency decisions that soften or nullify
regulatory legislation by interpretation or inaction,30 to executive assertions of
authority based on national security,31 to legislative attempts to enforce moral
standards through the criminal law,32 and, above all, to the authority of public
agencies at every level to direct (or neglect) the lives of subordinates and
dependents like schoolchildren, asylum inmates, nursing home residents,
public housing tenants, prisoners, schoolchildren, welfare recipients, public
employees-all the old wards of the Warren Court.33 Examined more closely,
the New Right's historical arguments fit squarely into the conventional
narratives of American legalism. Often they begin with the claim that society
has declined, but end up promising redemption: the story of legal liberty has
only been sidetracked, and with proper attention, can be rerouted back to the
main line.
To be sure, the summons to restore "original intent" was obviously much
more than a legal strategy: it was meant to underscore the theme of declension,
to summon the past to reproach the present. In some respects, the Reagan-era
conservatives did genuinely yearn to restore actual features, or what they took
to be actual features, of late 18th-century society: particularly, I would venture
to say, its practices of state support for Christian morality. (One does not know
how they would respond to historical scholarship suggesting that that society
was considerably less churchgoing, less respectful of religious belief, and more
bawdy and disorderly than our own).34 The slogan of original intent promises
to return us to a time before the beginning of our modern discontents. But the
actual historical location of that time is usually rather vague, and, most
interesting, tends to shift according to the field of attention. The Lucas case is
an example: the nuisance law that is invoked as a baseline is never exactly
pinned down in historical time. All that is certain is that it belongs to an era of
property-thinking in which the right to entrepreneurial development of land
is essential to property in it; an epoch predating that of the emerging
environmental consciousness, whose core notion is that sometimes the highest
and best use of land might be its non-development. 35
30See, e.g. Heckler v.Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
3 1See, e.g. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
32 See, e.g. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
33 See, e.g. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
34Jon Butler, supra note 28.
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Chiefly, it seems, the attempt is to revive the condition of late nineteenth
century classical liberal society. Many New Right intellectuals admire that
society for what they imagine to have been its devotion to laissez-faire
capitalism and the minimal state.36 Others admire the authoritarian social
control of that period, by both state and civil society, of deviant behavior.37
Some legal intellectuals of the New Right have sought faithfully to revive
almost all the main features of the Classical-liberal legal regime. In private law
this revival includes the negligence principle (or strict liability strongly laced
with contributory-negligence and assumption-of-risk defenses) as the basis of
tort liability, defacto regimes of minimal to zero liability for business-caused
hazards, contract law restored to the principle of strict formal enforcement
limited only by the most narrowly defined defenses of force and fraud, labor
law restored to the unrestricted employment-at-will doctrine, the corporation
conceived as nothing more than an aggregation of individual contracts. The
public law revival includes a well-policed public-private boundary strictly
limiting the government's capacity to invade or regulate property without
compensation, but removing all limits to the capacity of private owners to
regulate those on their property. In criminal law the revival includes an
increased unwillingness to regulate searches, arrests, detentions,
interrogations, and conditions of confinement. In general, the belief is in the
superior efficiency of common law to legislation as a mode of regulation. With
these and many similar doctrines much of the classical edifice has been rebuilt
brick by brick by legal intellectuals.38 Similarly, in much of the legislation
proposed by the current Congress and in decisions by the emerging New Right
majority of the current Supreme Court, many of these ideas are once again
becoming law.
What part has history played in re-naturalizing the classical system? The
most uncanny of the revivals, the more so because it was a completely
unconscious imitation of its 19th predecessors, the historical jurists, was the
revival among legal economists of a customary-evolutionary theory of the
common law.39 Once naturalized, common law property, tort and contract
rules could again function as the default legal constitution of the "private"
market, any major legislative changes would appear as excrescences,
superimpositions, "artificial" acts of "intervention." Starting from the premise
announced in dozens of articles purporting to demonstrate the efficiency of
36 See, e.g. BERNARD SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980).
37See, e.g. GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1995).
3 8The pioneer and outstanding exemplar of classical reconstruction is of course
Professor Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); FORBIDDEN GROUNDS
(1995).
3 9 See George L. Priest, The Common Law and the Efficient Selection of Legal Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 51 (1977).
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common-law rules, an evolutionary process was then hypothesized to explain
how judges could have managed so consistently to arrive at efficient
conclusions even though they hadn't any idea that that's what they might be
doing. The naturalized baseline, however, was less frequently the current
common law, as it had evolved through the twentieth century, but rather,
through yet another act of homage to the past, that of the classical period itself.
While conservative lawyers were renaturalizing something like the classical
common law, they were also devastating the statutory and administrative
legacies left by its Progressive critics. In this they were aided by real history.
Modem public-choice theory is bolstered by a series of historical case-studies
showing that regulation has usually been sought by regulated interests for their
own ends. Economic regulation was thinly disguised cartel enforcement.
Spending programs were mostly pork-barrel for special business or
middle-class beneficiaries. In its strong versions, the theory condemns almost
all the output of Parliamentary democracies as a kind of legalized theft
(assuming common law entitlements, once again, as the baseline establishing
vested property rights), "rent-seeking" on behalf of special interests. 40
To summarize, then: The new Right makes at least three kinds of historical
claims. First, there is a set of basic norms and principles that should be treated
as the constitutive ground rules of the American political, economic and social
system, entitled to authority because they have been historically encoded in
foundational legal forms (the original Constitutions, and common law and
legislative "traditions"). Second, at some point in historical time-exactly which
point shifts around quite a bit, but the preferred location is the mid-to-late 19th
century-these basic ground rules were actually in force, with beneficial results
for individual freedom, national prosperity, and social cohesion and morals.
Third, in more recent periods-in economic regulation, the New Deal; in race
relations, the period of affirmative action beginning in 1965; in social policy,
the 1960s-the basic rules have been radically departed from, violated or
distorted, with predictably horrible effects on freedom, prosperity and morals.
In these narratives, to cite the most striking example, America's tragic and
bloody history of racial oppression, from slavery through Jim Crow and
segregation, is interpreted primarily as a misguided departure from laissez-faire
principles; as having resulted from as excessive use of the state's police power
to limit the free market competition that would in short order have eradicated
racial caste distinctions or at least unmerited racial caste distinctions.41
Often these three claims are combined with a fourth: that there is a long-term
historical world-wide tendency towards restoration of a reinvigorated classical
liberalism. The story of how "the West" grew prosperous and rich and free
through the adoption of a strict framework of legal arrangements protecting
what's called "liberal capitalism," of which the most important component was
40See DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
4 1RicHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992); CLINT BOLICK, CHANGING COURSE:
CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE CROSSROADS (1988); DiNESH D'SouzA, THE END OF RACISM (1995).
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a regime of "strict property rights," has become, through its enthusiastic
sponsorship by the World Bank and Agency for International Development,
one of the USA's major export commodities. It has been coupled recently with
another story about the return to the market: How the world's societies, after
failed experiments with socialism, central state planning, Keynsian
redistribution, overregulation and overgenerous social spending are now,
under the pressure of global competition, returning to the classical premises.
The classical story, the escape from feudalism and mercantilism into
laissez-faire, the qualification of laissez-faire with unsuccessful bureaucratic
modification of the framework, the return to basics (what Mrs. Thatcher liked
to call "Victorian values"), is becoming deeply entrenched.
V. NEO-PROGRESSIVE AND RADICAL RESPONSES: COUNTERHSTORIES
The New Right initiative to reclaim the interpretation of constitutional and
legal history has touched off a minor cultural war, an American Kulturkampf
for the soul of the American legal system. Having re-established original
constitutional meanings as the prized territory of public law, the New Right
originalists saw their ground invaded by hosts of alien interpreters with
entirely different aims. The war opened up the Founding period and the
Reconstruction Amendments to a fresh wave of revisionists, each trying to
establish against competitors the authoritative reading of these constituional
moments.
Many of these revisers had as their ultimate aim to re-establish continuity
with the Progressive story of liberal society; a story in which the modem state
and its social policies could be vindicated and the New Right revolution put in
its proper place as an unfortunate hiatus. To retake Constitutional ground from
the conservatives, many liberal lawyers, rather unfortunately in my view,
dropped the prevailing Progressive theory of the dynamically expanding
Constitution and wandered back with the other time-travelers into the 18th
century. Once there they made the happy discovery of the "republican" or civic
humanist tradition of Atlantic political ideology rediscovered by J. G. A. Pocock
and his school.42 In that tradition, which clearly greatly influenced the
American Founding generation, individual personality is only fully realized
through the experience of self-government, through full participation in a polis
or republic; and for its maintenance the republic requires independent citizens
capable of the civic virtue that enables persons to identify their own interest
with the common good. Scholars like Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman have
been inspired by the republican revival to a general conception of the
constitutional design as something more than a framework for individual
self-seeking through the market, a political system designed to promote,
through a filter of high-minded disinterested representation, "deliberative"
42J.G.A. POcocK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975).
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democracy for the common good.4A3 The advantage of "republicanism" was that
it offered a respectable, native-born, Founding-period-based
communitarianism, a viewpoint from which to critique free-market
libertarianism that was a native-grown viewpoint untainted by association
with foreign socialisms or the Marxist tradition.44
Meanwhile, more left-of-center historians have been working up their own
historically-based counter-Constitutional histories, using as their working
materials the new history-from-the-bottom-up to recover the political/legal
mentalites of outgroups. This is an age-old technique of immanent critique. It
makes insurgent outgroups into the bearers of the utopian norms that, it hopes,
will eventually triumph as the dominant norms of the system. If the outgroup
does eventually triumph, its ideology becomes part of the official legal culture,
and its despised radical precursors are retroactively sanctified as its visionary
prophets. One of the most amazing features of the New Right's histories of race
relations, for example, is the way they have sanctified Martin Luther King, Jr.
as a prophet of their cause of "color-blindness." The new social-legal histories
take this method a logical step further, recovering the Constitutional ideas of
groups that never won out, or who were briefly successful and then crushed
and lost to history-nineteenth century artisanal republicans, the Radical
Republican programs and freedmen's movements of Reconstruction times, the
agrarian cooperative movements of the 1880s and 90s, the industrial unions of
the 1930s, the feminist movements of the 1850s, 1930s and 1970s, the civil rights
and farmworkers' movements of the 1960s and 70s, as the exponents (and
conceivably prophets?) of an alternative, very differently constituted social
order, a "Constitution of aspiration."45
Every party (and not just the New Right) apparently hoped to find in
historical Constitutionalism a new basis for forging consensus. What has
happened instead, naturally, was that the historical controversies simply
re-enact the modem ones. This Babel of contending originalisms has effectively
precluded the hardening of a general consensus comparable to the Classical or
Progressive narratives of progress in the Constitutional field, though each has
achieved a kind of local hegemony by ignoring the existence of the others.
But if I am right about the long-run New Right challenge, it is not in the field
of Constitutional law at all. Of considerably more importance, I have
suggested, are their stealth campaigns in the areas of private law and statutory
regulation. In these areas they have re-invigorated something resembling
nineteenth century classical common law as the "natural" or "default" legal
regime. The more successful that effort at naturalization is, the more those who
43 Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Frank
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1986).
44The best account of the 'republican revival' in law is in LAuRA KALMAN, THE
STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERLISM (1996).
4 5See the essays contributed to a Symposium organized in 1989 by the Organization
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would justify departures from it are put on the defensive to explain those
departures as "redistributions." So what I would guess to be the most important
historical battles, though also the least visible ones are being fought so low to
the ground that almost nobody notices what is going on. The focus down there
on the forest floor is on what the classical common lawyers called custom, the
routine doctrines and practices, common law and statutory, that have made up
the stuff of ordinary social relations, that have helped to constitute power,
community, and meaning.
VI. CRITIQUES OF THE REVIVAL OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LIBERALISM
It is to this debate about the optimal legal framework for liberal societies,
which the New Right claims is validated by having been encoded in American
legal traditions and by actual experience in practice, that, I believe, the insights
and techniques developed by legal scholars and historians inclined to critical
approaches to history have most of interest to contribute.
Since the New Right has been reassembling the classical-liberal system of
legal thought of 1880-1920, a promising source of inspiration for critique should
be the "New Liberals" (as they were called in England) or "Progressives" and
Legal Realists (USA) who confronted and criticized that thought in its own
time. (It's like a science-fiction movie. If your opponents bring to life a fabulous
monster, your best response is to resurrect the fabulous hero who once slew
that monster.) This strategy, which Morton Horwitz deploys in the second
volume of his Transformation of American Law,46 has paid handsome dividends.
Critical scholars have found the Progressives most worthy of imitation for the
techniques they used to de-naturalize the classical-legal constitution of the
market or the private sphere; to expose its foundations as both as historically
shifting and as theoretically incoherent.
One set of techniques, borrowed from the Progressive critics, is simply to
document that the libertarian-laissez-faire rule-system never really existed at all.
One can do this in part by detailing the myriad schemes of statutory and
administrative regulation that are a constant throughout the 19th century. As
older forms of public regulation (wage and price controls, statutory governance
of the labor contract, governance of corporate enterprise through conditions
and limitations on charters) faded out, new and even more extensive forms of
state authority took their place. Even the USA, supposedly the most libertarian
of nations, was always (especially at the state and local level) what the historian
William Novak calls a "well-regulated society."47 Another has been to locate the
regulatory doctrines at the heart of the common law rules themselves:
customary default rules governing contract, labor and tenancy relations,
regulated commons in grazing or fishing grounds or riparian rights, doctrines
46 MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
4 7 WILLIAM NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA (1996).
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of "public" rights limiting encroachments of private owners on public
resources.
In yet another strain of critique, also in some part borrowed from Progressive
and Legal Realist predecessors, in some part from classical social theory, critical
historians try to challenge the claim that, in fact as well as in theory, the classical
scheme is the optimal scheme for the maximizing of individual contractual
liberty. One line of this critique emphasizes the authoritarian aspects of the
classical scheme, all of the ways in which the legal system in fact authorized
regimes of near-despotic social control, especially in labor relations, family
relations, and in the regulation of deviants and dependents. The laborer might
be "free" to enter or not enter into the wage bargain, and theoretically to
negotiate the terms of his wages and hours. Once in the relationship, however,
he was subjected to a dense legal web of master-servant regulations, duties of
obedience and loyalty imported without embarrassment from ancient English
statutes of labor control.48 Indeed this supposedly optimally free society
required an enormous amount of open, visible, public coercion to maintain it,
especially against the instabilities promoted by an organized and politically
mobilized agrarian movement and industrial labor force. The classical-liberal
state threw away a lot of its legitimacy when, in order to protect its strict views
of entrepreneurial property and liberty, it had so frequently to resort to rule by
the labor injunction enforced by federal troops.49 The most elementary
liberal-capitalist social order, as we discovered in the heyday of industrial class
conflict and in the terrorist violence of the Reconstruction South and are
discovering all over again in the Hobbesian nightmare of post-Communist
Russia, requires an enormous commitment of state force and capacity, the
power and legitimacy to extract taxes to pay for security and justice, the
bureaucratic capacity for monitoring and enforcement, to protect the basic
institutions of property and exchange against force, fraud and corruption.
The opposite but complementary critical strategy is to point out that in its
actual historical practice, the classical scheme had elements that in comparison
to those of today's New Right seem positively radical. For one thing, the
classical liberals took their individualism seriously, so much so that they
believed the free individual was seriously endangered by increasing
concentrations of private economic power. They thought a vigorous antitrust
policy was essential to maintaining individual freedom as well as republican
citizenship. The great figures of 19th century classical constitutionalism, men
like Stephen J. Field and Thomas Cooley, regarded the kind of subsidies,
exemptions and tolerance for combination and concentration that present-day
state policies routinely extend to business as an abject selling-out of the cause
of sturdy self-governing individual citizens and equality of individual right to
the control of wealth, economic dependence and monopoly. They would have
4 8 See KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM (1991); VICroRIA HATrAM, LABOR VISIONS
AND STATE POwER (1993).
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been genuinely appalled by the reduction of the moral, political and
distributive goals of antimonopoly policy to "efficiency" and "consumer
welfare," as if such goods could compensate for the loss of republican
independence and individual liberty (defined as the opportunity to rise to
self-sufficent "free labor").50 Such classical liberals also assumed (and here the
contrast with today's libertarians is perhaps most stark) that the reason that the
law need prescribe only minimal social duties was that strict moral and social
codes would ensure that the better-off classes would act on the obligation to
protect and care for their employees and communities; their libertarianism
assumed a system of strongly enforced norms of social paternalism. It was
when private paternalism visibly failed to alleviate the problems of poverty,
unemployment, workplace abuse and family breakup, that classical reformers
created the programs of protective regulation and benefits which are the
recognizable ancestors of today's regulatory-welfare state. The origins of
modern social policy, both in its better and its worse aspects, in its
compassionate generosity and concern for social cohesion and well as in its
repressive paternalism, lie not the in the 1960s "counterculture," but in Victorian
values themselves.51
In short, the institutions that the classical revival sees as ad hoc associations
of individuals, making contracts that maximize their interests, the revisionists
are likely to reanalyze as hierarchies or communities, both more authoritarian
and more cooperative, and certainly more embedded and culture-laden: the
quasi-feudal structure of master-servant relations, systems of racial, gender
and ethnic caste subordination for organizing household, farm and even
industrial labor, existing alongside strikingly egalitarian cooperative-
producers associations, managed commons, ethnically-homogeneous fishing
grounds, small and closely regulated public utilities, union-run factories.
All this has been meant to convey in a brief space some of the drama and
intensity of lawyers' struggles over the history of their public and private law.
Now we have to ask if any of this matters, whether it is not all wasted breath,
the disputations of scholastics.
Is it worth doing just because lawyers so often, we think, "get it wrong," and
should "get it right" instead? The answer cannot be, though it is the answer
often given, that it profanes the past to get it wrong, as lawyers so often do, by
the criteria of professional historical practice. After all, getting history "wrong,"
distorting the past, relying on false analogies, wrenching verbal formulae from
their originating contexts and putting them to different uses, has been one of
50See Charles McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business
Relations, 61 J. OF AMERICAN HISTORY 970 (1975); ALAN JONES, THE CONSTITLIONAL
CONSERVATISMOF THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY (1987); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire
and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
3 LAW AND HISTORY REV. 293 (1985).
51See DAVID ROBERTS, VICTORIAN ORIGINS OF THE BRITISH WELFARE STATE (1960);
THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992).
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the great forces of creative innovation in the law. Holmes once argued in fact
that "ignorance is the best of law reformers"-those who do not remember the
past have the least work to do unlearning it.
Is the virtue of historical inquiry that it destroys myth-making-for example,
that it makes it unthinkable to extract hard-and-fast doctrinal rules from the
study of "original intentions" or that by exploding the fairytales of evolutionary
progress it disabuses us of the notion that there is a simple linear progressive
path of progress that we must adhere to? The hope of the Progressive
modernizers was that history would rid the present of the dead weight of
survivals, leaving us free to purposefully refashion our futures. It is hard to
believe any more in the possibility of this kind of release from history; it is all
too easy to historicize the modernists themselves, to see what a weight of
unconscious inherited baggage they brought to the task of social-engineering,
including their own set of mythic progressive narratives. Anyway, what
historical experience suggests that people, including lawyers, disabused of
myths of progress do any better than those under their spell? Of course those
myths can induce a Panglossian complacency about the status quo as the most
presumptively just and efficient set of arrangements on earth-or for that
matter, a fanatic revolutionary fervor so confident that history is on its side that
it will overlook any cruelties inflicted in the name of progress. Still, the
narrative of liberal society as the gradual release of liberty from feudal
restraints towards greater personal liberty and political inclusion has also been
an immensely powerful force for emancipation. Ask the abolitionists of slavery,
or the civil rights lawyers, who knew that the actual historical Constitution was
a "covenant with death and pact with hell" in its protection of slavery, and later
of segregation, but that nonetheless American liberal-legality might be read to
hold immanent norms of freedom that could, that would with fighting human
agents at their side, be gradually realized with unfolding time-that in the
words of the Langston Hughes poem, "America, [which] never was America
to me ... will be."52 The reformer's most effective ideological weapon has
always been the metaphor of America's unfulfilled promise. Exploding this
myth, one might well think, is not the most helpful advice the historian can
bring to the Party of Humanity.
On the other hand, maybe it is-if the myth is that America has already
fulfilled its promise, or can do so by pruning its legal system down to its
minimalist classical core. Here the argument for complexifying our view of the
past through history is an argument for showing how multiple and conflicting
the traditions are, all the different kinds of narratives that can be told about the
past, the kind of thing I've been doing in this lecture. We open up, one version
of this argument goes, a space for freedom and innovation, not in the escape
from history, but in choosing which traditions and trajectories to attach
ourselves to. Of course the availability of all these options may seem to deprive
history of any independent force in political argument: it's just another kind
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of rhetoric you resort to in order to get what you want. Having a different view
of history in your arsenal is only good for convincing the incredibly rare power
holder whose mind is really going to be changed by another take on what
happened in 1793.
So I am not going to make any generalized argument for the uses of a more
contextualized, complexified, multivalent, ironic, contradictory, historicized
kind of history, which is after all just another way of telling a story. My
argument is peculiar to the historical situation we find ourselves in-which is,
I think, one in which a particular strong version, a revival of the classical
version of the legal history of liberal societies is again coming into dominance
in the Western world. The importance of history complicating narratives is
chiefly in the way it reveals embedded alternatives in actual practices (not
always admirable alternatives, to be sure, but suggestive of future possibilities)
and these days perhaps especially in the way that it exposes the dream of
achieving optimal freedom through a purified libertarian capitalism, protected
by a purified neo-classical rule of law, as a utopian fantasy. It is a dream of
reviving a state of society that never existed and brought many ugly
consequences with it to the extent it did-a dream in its own way quite as
fantastic, and in the present world potentially almost as dangerous, as the old
dream of communism.
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